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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how agricultural protection has been
reduced before/after the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 1995 in East
Asian countries. Our empirical results show that the reduction on agricultural protection in
the second half of the 1990s is not outstanding, compared with that in the first half of the
1990s. This result implies that the UR Agreement does not substantially succeed in reducing
the protection for agricultural trade in East Asia.
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Uruguay  Round  (UR)  in  1995  was  very  successful  in  constituting  the  Agreement  on 
Agriculture  (AOA)  and  in  promoting  agricultural  trade  liberalization  into  force  with  the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).    The AOA incorporated new rules and 
commitments  in  three  areas:  market  access  (tariffication),  domestic  support,  and  export 
subsidies toward implementation of trade liberalization in agriculture.    These commitments 
have been implemented over a 6 year period (10 years for developing countries).    In the case 
of  tariffication  (i.e.,  tariff  reduction)  of  the  UR  AOA,  36%  (24%)  average  reduction  by 
developed countries (developing countries), with a minimum per tariff line reduction of 15% 
(10%) was required. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how agricultural protection has been 
reduced before/after the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 1995 in East 
Asian countries.    Honma et al. (2000) point out that the volume of agricultural trade has not 
substantially increased in East Asian countries after the implementation of the UR Agreement.   
Although the tariffication was introduced to improve market access, tariff equivalents remain 
prohibitively high for many commodities, limiting imports in a similar way to the previous 
import quotas.    OECD (2001) reports that the agricultural tariffs remain very high in most 
OECD  countries,  with  average  agricultural  tariffs  higher  than  those  for  non-agricultural 
products and with tariff rates on some agricultural products exceeding 500 percent.    In the 
following, we examine if the UR AOA has not accelerated the pace of reduction on agricultural 
protection in East Asian countries. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    In  section  2,  we  explain  our  empirical 
methodology and data sources.    Section 3 presents our empirical results.    In section 4, we 
conclude. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
This paper measures the level of agricultural protection by employing a log odds ratio method 
as in Head and Mayer (2000) and Hayakawa (2007).    The method enables us to resolve the 
problem that data of agricultural price indices are unavailable. 
Supposing finished goods distinguished by country of origin and a CES type utility function, 
utility  maximization by  the  representative  consumer  gives the  following expression for the 
demand in country i for the good produced in country j,  j i c , : 
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where t, σ, p, P, and E denote trade costs formulated by iceberg, the elasticity of substitution 
between goods, the producer price, the price index, and the total expenditure, respectively.   
From this equation, we obtain a ratio of inter-national import values to intra-national import 
values  j i X , , as follows: 
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This  formulation  relates  the  decisions  of  the  consumers  in  country  i  on  how  to  allocate 
expenditure between finished goods produced in country j and the goods produced domestically. 
The producer price is assumed to be a function of wage rates (wage) and technology (tech).                 2 
 
 
That is, the relative producer prices are specified as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i j i j i j tech tech wage wage p p ln ln ln ln ln 2 1 0 − + − + ≡ η η η . 
In the empirical part, GDP per capita is used as a proxy for wage rates.    Agricultural land per 
farm worker is used as a proxy for technology and is measured by agricultural land area, which 
is the sum of arable land area and the land area under permanent crops, meadows, and pastures, 
divided by the number of male farm workers. 
We assume that trade costs consist of policy protection against foreign goods, transportation 
costs incurred by geographical distance, and the costs due to differences in preferences.    In the 
empirical part, the policy protection is quantified by examining a coefficient for an importer 
dummy variable.    The differences in preferences are partly controlled by a cultural dummy 
variable language, which is a binary variable taking unity if countries i and j share a common 
official language and zero otherwise.    We also introduce a contingency dummy variable, which 
is a binary variable taking unity if the two countries share a common land border and zero 
otherwise. 
Consequently, the equation to be estimated is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i j i i j i j j i d d tech tech wage wage X , , 3 2 1 0 , ln ln ln ln ln ln ' ln − + − + − + + = β β β µ γ β
              j i j i j i y contingenc language , , 5 , 4 ε β β + + + .            ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿                   (1) 
j i d ,   is geographical distance between country i and j and is measured by greater circle between 
their respective capital cities.    i i d ,   is intra-national distance and is calculated as a radius of 
surface area in country i.    µ and  j i, ε   are a vector of importer dummy variables and a normally 
distributed random error, respectively.    The coefficients for the importer dummy variables are 
called “home bias” in Wei (1996), and a natural logarithm of protection in each country is 
represented by the respective dummy coefficient divided by 1-σ. 
    Data  sources  are  as  follows:  the  data  on  inter-national  agricultural  import  values  and 
intra-national consumption values are obtained from Asian International Input-Output Table 
published  by  the  Institute  of  Developing  Economics  (IDE).    We  use  the  aggregated  final 
private consumption values in agricultural, livestock, forestry, and fishery of finished goods to 
avoid zero import values.    We have a total of nine East Asian countries (China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) and the 
U.S. in the year 1990, 1995, and 2000.    Data on GDP per capita are obtained from World 
Development  Indicator.    The  source  of  geographical  distance  and  of  the  language  and 
contingency variables is CEPII database.    Data on agricultural land area and the number of 
male  farm  workers  are  obtained  from  FAOSTAT.    To  avoid  the  dummy  trap  in  importer 
dummy  variables,  we  select  Singapore  because  of  its  little  agricultural  trade  protection.   
Assuming  that  Singapore-specific  protection  is  zero  and  that  the  Armington  elasticity  of 
substitution  is  constant  during  the  period,  we  investigate  the  changes  in  country-specific 
protection  in  each  country  by  examining  the  changes  in  coefficients  for  importer  dummy 
variables. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
This section measures the protection to agricultural trade in East Asia by estimating the 
equation derived in section 2.    The basic statistics are reported in Table 1.    Table 2 reports the               3 
 
 
results in the estimation of equation (1) by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
Let  us  take  a  look  at  the  result  in  relative  wage  and  relative  technology  in  Table  2.   
Coefficients for most of the variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant.   
Relative distance, language dummy, and contingency dummy variables have the expected signs 
but are not significant.    The higher the relative technology of an exporter is, or the lower its 
relative factor price is, the more the relative imports are. 
The results of policy protection are as follows: the insignificance in constant terms may 
indicate that policy protection in Singapore has been zero.    Estimated coefficients for importer 
dummy  variables  are  negatively  significant.    The  columns  between  1990  and  1995  and 
between 1995 and 2000 report the result of the Wald test with the null hypothesis that each 
coefficient is identical between the two years.    The results of the Wald test indicate that there is 
not much statistical difference in coefficients for importer dummy variables especially between 
1995  and  2000.    That  is,  the  UR  AOA  does  not  play  a  critical  role  in  agricultural  trade 
liberalization. 
We can express the protection in each country in the ad valorem tariff equivalent, which is 
calculated  by  the  coefficient  for  each  importer  dummy  variable  divided  by  1-σ,  i.e., 
(exp(dummy coef./( 1-σ))-1).    To this end, the value of the elasticity of substitution would be 
required.    We choose 4 for σ according to Hertel et al. (2003) though choice of the value has 
little influence on changes in the protection as long as assuming that the elasticity is constant 
during the period. 
The tariff equivalents are shown in Table 3.    In the year 1990, China (3951%) dominated 
the highest protection, and Malaysia (92%) did the lowest protection.    In the first half of the 
1990s,  developing  countries  remarkably  reduced  their  protection.    The  tariff  equivalent 
particularly in China declined drastically from 3951% to 489%.    On the other hand, in the 
second half of the 1990s, after the UR AOA, the pace of its reduction is not accelerated in 
almost all countries.    Particularly in the Philippines and Thailand, the tariff equivalent declined 
only slightly, compared with that in the first half of the 1990s. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper quantifies the level of agricultural protection in East Asian countries before/after 
the UR AOA.    Our empirical results show that the reduction on agricultural protection in the 
second half of the 1990s is not outstanding, compared with that in the first half of the 1990s.   
This result implies that the UR AOA does not substantially succeed in reducing the protection 
for agricultural trade in East Asia.               4 
 
 
Table 1. Basic statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
relative imports 258 -7.04 2.82 -16.83 0.29
relative distance 258 8.20 0.88 5.76 9.70
relative wage 258 0 2.19 -3.96 3.96
relative technology 258 0 2.28 -5.92 5.92
language 258 0.19 0.39 0 1
contingency 258 0.07 0.26 0 1  
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Table 2. Regression results 
1990 1995 2000
relative distance -0.44 -0.24 -0.25
(0.39) (0.32) (0.33)
relative wage 0.08 -0.22** -0.47***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
relative technology 0.68*** 0.75*** 0.96***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
language -0.42 -0.23 0.27
(0.50) (0.41) (0.41)
contingency 0.59 0.02 0.48
(0.97) (0.80) (0.81)
Indonesia -5.28*** -4.17*** -2.90***
(1.02) (0.83) (0.84)
Malaysia -1.96* -1.41* -0.33
(1.02) (0.84) (0.85)
Philippines -6.02*** ** -4.25*** * -2.99***
(0.91) (0.74) (0.75)
Thailand -5.14*** ** -3.54*** -3.43***
(0.95) (0.78) (0.77)
China -11.10*** *** -5.32*** -4.34***
(0.98) (0.81) (0.82)
Taiwan -4.63*** * -3.61*** ** -4.94***
(0.80) (0.65) (0.66)
Korea -4.37*** -4.37*** -3.35***
(0.86) (0.70) (0.71)
Japan -2.97*** -2.55*** -2.13***
(0.88) (0.72) (0.72)
US 1.01 0.30 1.24
(1.74) (1.42) (1.44)
constant 0.13 -1.97 -2.71
(2.96) (2.44) (2.47)
Obs. 86 86 86
R-sq 0.7797 0.7252 0.7628  
Notes: ***, ** and * shows 1%, 5% and 10% significant, respectively.    In parentheses is a 
White consistent standard error.    The columns between 1990 and 1995 and between 1995 and 
2000 report the result of the Wald test with the null hypothesis that each coefficient is identical 
between the two years. 
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Table 3. The tariff equivalent of agricultural protection 
1990 1995 2000
Indonesia 482% 302% 163%
Malaysia 92% 60% 12%
Philippines 643% 312% 171%
Thailand 455% 225% 213%
China 3951% 489% 325%
Taiwan 369% 234% 420%
Korea 329% 330% 206%
Japan 169% 134% 103%  
Notes: The ad valorem tariff equivalent is calculated by (exp(dummy coef./ (1-σ))-1).    We 
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